Protecting the identities of covert agents has always been a priority for intelligence agencies. It simply makes sense. An agent operating under his or her real name when recruiting or running their informants or sources risks discovery not only themselves but also those informants and sources.

James Bond actor Roger Moore once said something like he didn’t think Bond would be a very effective agent because everyone knew his name, what he drank, how he dressed, what he drove, etc. Granted, Bond explained his presence in a particular country or region as being employed by Universal Exports. On the face of it that’s a good cover. Being involved in exporting is perfect for explaining why an Englishman might be out and about in any country.

In reality, intelligence operatives operate under a cover name and an employment cover, e.g., a media consultant or agricultural attaché at an embassy. They need this because they may recruit assets (informants and sources) in different countries, and they don’t need some analyst somewhere correlating that Jane Doe (real name) is a busy little bee among a country’s populace.

Sometimes added to the cover is a subtle, or significant, change in appearance for the agent. Colored contact lenses, wigs in different styles or color, different styles of clothing. Some operatives will alter the way they speak, their mannerisms, or their manners.

The latex masks made famous by Mission Impossible are now reality, too. Once, to prove a point to President George H.W. Bush, the CIA’s former Chief of Disguise (Yes, it was a department with a chief.) Jonna Mendez disguised herself as a Latina woman who was brought along to a presidential briefing about the agency’s new mask technology and the budget needed for making those masks. To prove her point, mid-meeting, she peeled off her mask ala Mission Impossible, removed her contact lenses, and showed that beneath the realistic disguise of a dark-haired, dark-eyed Latina was a blond, blue-eyed Jonna Mendez. Allegedly, President Bush was entertained by the reveal.

Another key reason why keeping the identity of a covert agent hidden are the assets they recruit. The assets agents recruit are betraying their countries, and if these assets are discovered, it could mean prison or even execution. In the early 1960s, a Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer named Oleg Penkovsky began providing secrets to western intelligence organizations, who worked hard to keep his identity secret, giving him the code name “Hero” to be used in all communications and documents. But Penkovsky wasn’t discovered by the KGB because of his handlers.

No, Penkovsky was betrayed by another betrayer. An NSA employee named Jack Dunlap revealed Penkovsky’s identity and activities to the KGB. Dunlap was a KGB asset in the CIA who had access to the classified document that identified Penkovsky as Hero. Penkovsky was recalled to Moscow, tried, and executed. Rumor has it that he was executed before a class of new KGB and GRU recruits by being cremated alive. That’s never been proved, and the official cause of death issued by the Soviet Union was that he committed suicide in a Soviet labor camp.

Let’s bring in Valerie Plaime, a CIA covert operative who was identified as such to the public by someone in the George W. Bush administration. Once that happened, she was rendered useless to the CIA, and every single asset she’d cultivated was at risk of arrest. Not because her name was revealed but because her picture became public, too. She left the CIA two years before she was eligible to retire because she was “burned.” She was essentially useless to the agency.

Remember the television show from the late 2000s, Burn Notice? A covert operative named Michael Westen received a “burn notice” from his agency that his identity had been revealed but in such a way he appeared to be a traitor. Over the next four seasons, he’s on the run while trying to prove his innocence and hiring himself out to anyone who needs his “special” talents. Improbable at times, but a good show. Does he prove his innocence and get reinstated? Spoilers.

Unfortunately, we rarely hear what happens to a blown agent’s assets, with a couple of exceptions. When Aldridge Ames and Robert Hanssen were selling secrets to the Soviet Union, the KGB used them to confirm people they suspected of being double agents for the west. In debriefing Ames and Hanssen after arrest, the CIA was able to confirm at least three of their assets in Soviet intelligence were executed as a result of their betrayal.

So, how can the identities of covert operatives be protected?

Great Britain has the Official Secrets Act, since 1889 in fact. A hundred+ years later, this legislation was repealed and replaced with the National Security Act of 2023. The purpose of this Act was to prevent disclosure of national security information and to prevent the unlawful disclosure of such information by government employees. You could run afoul of the OSA by doing the following.

• Obtaining or disclosing information useful to an enemy
• Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets
• Assisting a foreign intelligence service
• Reporting the location of or creating sketches of military, naval, or air defense bases
• Harboring people suspected of gathering intelligence

The United States has the Espionage Act of 1917 and 18 USC Section 798. Related to these laws are the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, and the Classified Information Procedures Act. But since I’ve been talking about keeping the identities of covert operatives and their assets secret, I’m going to focus on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA) of 1982.

The IIPA makes it illegal to reveal the identities of covert U.S. intelligence agents and also protects the identities of those agents’ assets, i.e., other agents, informants, and sources. IIPA applies to anyone who has access to classified information and specifically to those who intentionally try to identify and expose covert agents. It applies to those who know that the information disclosed will identify a covert agent, as well as to any covert agents’ assets, whose identity the U.S. is specifically trying to hide.

The IIPA is interesting in that the punishments prescribed for breaking this law increase in severity depending on how much classified information the offender had access to.

Were the people who “burned” Valerie Plaime convicted under the IIPA? Unfortunately, no. A single individual pled guilty to perjury and lying to federal agents. President Bush commuted his sentence, and the individual was also later pardoned. A suit filed against the administration by Ms. Plaime was dismissed and never came to trial.

Now, the whole reason I’ve gone on about the importance of keeping the identities of covert agents secret is because within the last month, the White House requested and received the names of CIA agents who’d been employed less than one year, so-called probationary government employees. Those names were supplied per White House instructions from a non-secure email account, rendering the discovery of these individuals possible.

Granted, in less than a year, most of those agents likely hadn’t recruited many assets, and the damage may be minimal—let’s hope. But those probationary covert agents are essentially “burned.” Even if the courts decide that this act was illegal or didn’t follow appropriate procedures, those employees could become, like Valerie Plaime or the fictional Michael Westen, more of a liability than an asset to the government.

And that’s a shame, because all these people wanted to do was serve their country.

We need to get back to that WWII security adage: “Loose lips sink ships.”

In my humble opinion.